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FRANK IKARD ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW I

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Gift of Personal Statement

By FRANK IKARD

to the

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ACCESSION NUMBER 76-26

DATE: June 15, 1970

INTERVIEWEE: Frank Ikard (Tape 1 of 1)

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

PLACE: Mr. Ikard's office in Washington, D.C.

F: This is an interview with Mr. Frank Ikard, in his office in Washington on June 15, 1970. The interview is being conducted by Joe B. Frantz.

Mr. Ikard, I have some interest in you since you come from my part of the world. My wife lived in Byers, Texas, and she looked on Henrietta (Texas) as the place to go when you wanted to live a bit. You came out of that Wichita Falls area and were a member of Congress for about six terms?

I: I guess I was elected seven times, but I came in and filled out an unexpired term, and then resigned in mid-term, so I did not serve fourteen years but (was) elected seven times.

F: You had been a judge prior to your election?

I: Yes, the judge of the 30th Judicial District Court in Wichita County, Texas.

F: And then you came up here in 1951?

I: That's right, I think it was the 8th or 9th of September, 1951, the date of that election. It was a special election.

F: Had you prior to that time gotten to know Lyndon Johnson?

I: Yes, I first knew President Johnson--well, actually I first met him when he ran for Congress and I was in the University in the mid-30's. I've forgotten when that would have been.

F: '37.

I: Then many of my friends were interested in his campaign. I frankly, was not, but I did meet him, and he was a bright, attractive young man. We used to go around and listen to him.

F: You were aware that he was running, in other words.

I: That's right.

- F: Did you see much of him in the years that moved ahead until you came--
- I: I guess the next time that I had any real contact with him was when he ran for the Senate the first time, and I was active in his campaign in north Texas. I was then practicing law in Wichita Falls.
- F: A question that's intrigued me, I don't know whether it has anything to do with this except it's a slice of Americana; how come you to go into the service as a PFC when, with your background, you could have gone into the Judge Advocate General's office?
- I: Well what happened on that was one of those things where I went in as a private in the infantry to take infantry basic, with the view of what I thought was all arranged to transfer to intelligence after finishing basic training. Now the thing I didn't know at the time I got involved was that the prelude to the invasion of Europe was occurring and that once you got into the infantry you didn't get out! So, it's like so many times when you make plans and arrangements, they always don't work out like you plan.
- F: I had two or three young friends who were young county attorneys down in the central Texas area at that time and they all thought they were going into the Judge Advocate General's office, and wound up in either tank or anti-tank--
- I: Well, this is the same thing that happened to me, except at a lower level, I mean rank-wise. You knew or remember Bill Francis, I imagine?
- F: Yes.
- I: Bill was a colonel in Dallas in Army Intelligence at this time and we were very close friends. And I was told if I would take this basic training there at Mineral Wells, then immediately upon finishing that I'd be transferred into Intelligence, and probably get a direct commission or something. But as I say, this was about the time of the climax of the war and once I got in, why then, like everyone else I had to where--
- F: Right. I'm sure politically it was a good thing.
- I: It's like many other things that happen to you. Once it's over you have no regrets about it, yet you wouldn't want to do it again.
- F: I interrupted you, you were going to describe your interim acquaintance with Mr. Johnson.
- I: I started to say, the first real contact I had with him that I now remember, was during the first senatorial campaign. I was involved to the point of working for him around in that part of the state, and we had a number of mutual friends. There was a man in Wichita

Falls by the name of Colonel W. T. Knight. He was an oil man and very active in democratic politics and very interested in Lyndon Johnson. And Rhea Howard, who I'm sure you know, publisher of the newspapers--

F: The Record Times?

I: Yes, and the firm I was with represented both of these people and while I had no intimate contact with Johnson, at least we had a lot of friends like Joe Kilgore and Jake Pickle and people who had been involved back in that congressional campaign. So for that reason I was interested in his senatorial efforts. Then after that I don't guess I really had much contact with him, other than what you would normally have, because I went on about my business and became a judge. I used to come up here (Washington) right after the war, I was a member of the National Board of the American Red Cross, so I used to come up here to the meetings, I guess, once a month. During those times I would normally see him or go by his office or something. But it was a very casual kind of an acquaintance, one that was not intimate in any way.

F: Did you have much of a problem in your Wichita Falls area? I was down in Weatherford about that time and I remember that Lyndon was looked upon as almost horribly liberal to lots of people, much more so than he actually was. Whereas Coke Stevenson, you know, represented the kind of quiet pipe-smoking Texan and he had, we won't get into why, but he had finished his governorship with a surplus in the state treasury, and he represented all the good conservative virtues.

I: As a matter of fact, I supported Stevenson in the second race, which is kind of an odd thing, I guess.

F: You mean for governor?

I: No, for senator. When I say the second race, I'm talking about the second Johnson race, and on account of the fact that he had been governor and practicing law around that time, and he had a lot of contacts. I'd gotten to know him and frankly had some obligation to him which he was able to--and as I say, my relationship with Johnson was casual.

F: So you came up here in '51 to finish out the term and were reelected in '52. And by this time Johnson's star is rising rather rapidly.

I: To go back, when I came to Congress, Walter Jenkins, who you also know, was also from Henrietta, Wichita Falls, and he married Marjorie Whitehill, who's from Wichita Falls. So when Ed Gossett, who was the congressman from the 13th District resigned to go with the telephone company, then there was the special election. There were about 8 or 9 of us that ran, and Walter was in that race. It was a rather heated campaign, and while there was never any personal feeling on my part about--as a matter of fact, in later years,

Walter, and I think now, is one of my closest friends, we never had any personal problem about it. But as you well know sometimes political campaigns get--in any event this was a heated campaign. It was one that everybody wanted to win, and fortunately for me, I won it.

So, Senator Johnson was an important man in Washington, and I would say it was at that time that our close relationship began. Because I remember the first person I ever went to see when I came to Washington was Senator Johnson.

F: And in a sense you had defeated his man.

I: That's right, and I felt that it was important that I establish some kind of relationship with that office, because, one, he, I felt, had a great future and a very important man, and as a freshman congressman I didn't want to get myself in a box where I would be--so I went over and visited with him, I never will forget, and explained to him at least my feeling that I would hope that we could work together and cooperate.

He was very gracious about it and said that while he certainly, you know, was interested in Walter as he should have been quite properly because Walter had been with him. Anyway, we went on--this was really the beginning of what became a very close relationship. And I think at least from my standpoint, one of mutual confidence to where we worked very closely then through the years.

F: Is this usual for the congressmen to get together with senators, or do you tend to go your own, as if you are members of two different clubs?

I: I think you tend to go your own way. I felt that this was kind of a special instance because we had so much common support. I mean by that, well, again to mention like Rhea Howard who was my close friend and the Senator's close friend, and in other words the people who elected me were essentially the Johnson people. The reason they didn't vote for Walter Jenkins wasn't any fact that they disliked Walter. The fact was that Walter had been working for him for twenty years--

F: Walter had been away.

I: Had been away, and I'd been there as judge and a man whose name appeared in the paper every day, and I was out working with juries and that sort of thing. And while I would like to think that it was some magic superior quality I had, it actually was just the fact that I was there and Walter had been gone for a long time. For that reason, since we did have a kind of--or in that area--the same basic support, I felt it was important. That if we went opposite ways that one of us would necessarily lose that and I didn't think there was any difference much philosophically, and there wasn't any reason why we shouldn't.

F: You became known as one of Mr. Sam Rayburn's closer supporters, and Mr. Sam often at least intimated that you were sort of a protege of his. Did this bring you into closer contact with Johnson?

I: Yes it did because I was privileged to have a close relationship with Mr. Rayburn, who I really think was probably the greatest man in his influence in government--

F: I guess your district's tough, too, don't they?

I: Yes, from my experience, I really think his influence was tremendous. Well of course his district joined mine on the east, and so there again this was a matter of--Garza-Little Elm Lake, all this Texoma, which in those days--all these things were common to the two districts, so we necessarily had to work together or work against each other, and we worked together. And I had great admiration for him and found him to be a very fine man and, of course, President Johnson was a confidant, a protege, almost like a son really to Mr. Rayburn. The relationship was very intimate, very close. And so, naturally, being with the Speaker you'd see the then either Whip or Majority Leader.

F: Did you consult with Mr. Johnson on what committee assignments you should try for?

I: No, no.

F: You work that out with the leadership?

I: No, I came up here, as we've said, in the middle of a term and my committee assignment, I got to be on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which coming from a district that's probably 600 miles from the nearest water, my constituency took a rather dim view of it.

And so Judge Combs, who was from the coast--Beaumont, Port Arthur area, had been on the committee of Ways and Means, and had unfortunately a terminal illness, and there was a vacancy on that committee that traditionally at least, Texas had a chance to. So I talked to Mr. Rayburn about it, and this was really a more important assignment than I would probably get, but I had the feeling that if I asked for something like that then I might get something--well, for anyway, for some reason that I've never quite known, and it's one of those happenstances I think that so often affect a person's career, Mr. Rayburn liked the idea apparently that I go on that committee. The result was that I went on the committee on Ways and Means at a very early age. Not early in years, but early in service in the House. And I don't think, at least on the House side, I don't think that anybody would dispute the fact that it's the most important committee from a legislative standpoint and of course, the Democratic members of the committee serve on the Committee on Committees where you place all the other Democratic members of the House. And each member of the committee on Ways and Means, Democratic member, has a region that he represents. Well, I represented Texas, New Mexico and Oklahoma. And I was

responsible for the committee assignments of all the Democrats in the House from those three states.

F: It established you as a key person fairly early then.

I: That's right. I was fortunate in that respect. And this again is where I came in very close contact with the very special Johnsonian way of operations. I never will forget, we had finished our committee assignments. As you well know this takes a day or two of continual meeting and you try to fit all these committees. It's only the new men that are involved, and then people that want to change committees, but it gets complicated.

And I never will forget, we had finished this rather arduous task of two or three days of trading and working around and trying to get all the Democrats happy or as nearly happy as we could, and the then Majority Leader called me and said he'd sure like to see me. I said, "Fine," and went over to see him. Senator Clinton Anderson was in his office, and he said that--I've forgotten what the issue was, but some very high-level strategy had been conducted and the whole basis of the whole arrangement was that I get Joe Montoya on Appropriations or something else, and Tom Morris, who was another congressman from New Mexico. Anyway, just almost impossible committee assignments because the committee had already adjourned. And of course to lesser men you could have very easily have said, "Sorry, Senator, the committee's adjourned; it's all over."

F: I'm sure though the task of reopening--

I: But anyway, then after Senator Anderson left, Senator Johnson in a way that you well know I'm sure, only that he could do, said, "I know you can work this out if you want to. This is very important." And of course we did work it out, but it wasn't easy. This was the sort of thing that we became accustomed to working together very closely on many things of this sort.

Then the development of all social security legislation, tax legislation, trade and tariff legislation, this sort of thing that he had a great interest in as Majority Leader of the Senate. We were able to through trying to keep his office informed, to let him anticipate things and hopefully react a little quicker than you could have otherwise, if you hadn't had--

F: You never had any problems with him on matters within your district on who would make the announcements? How did you coordinate that?

I: Just the contrary. Some people did, as I'm sure you know, but I never had this problem. I think the reason I didn't was this first conversation that I'm talking about having had with him, which was a rather frank one, but it resulted--I don't recall that we ever had any problems and I know if we found out something, which let me hurriedly say very seldom

because his intelligence was superior to anybody's, I'm talking about the way of finding out things, not his personal intelligence, which was great too. But if we found out we'd always check with Walter or somebody in his office, Walter Jenkins, and ask them if it was important to them, if they needed to send out a joint telegram or make joint calls, or make joint statements. Whenever they released anything they always were very gracious in including my name in it. So I'm not suggesting that they didn't get Johnson's name on it, but--

F: But you never really felt competitive in that sense?

I: I never felt that at all. Now I know there were other areas where that was not the case, but that was a problem I never had. And we had a very, I thought, smooth working arrangement on it, where in effect each of us agreed that anything we released we'd at least give the other one an opportunity to get their name on it. There were sometimes things that, again as I'm sure the political implications of them are such that the Senator maybe didn't want his name on.

F: Did he work with you and Congressman Rayburn in this matter of water development in your area?

I: Yes sir, very closely.

F: Was he sort of the Senate advocate for it?

I: Yes, yes very much. I know on occasion--I remember very well on some of the things the reference I guess it was to the Garza-Little Elm Reservoir there and the repairing of some dams in Baylor County, that he was able to in one instance get them increased, and in another instance to get them put into appropriation bills, where we had been unable to do it in the House.

F: Was he in on the Kemp Reservoir?

I: Yes. You see Kemp was privately built back in the 20's I guess, and long before I became really old enough to be interested, and it was a monumental task but a real failure because the water, it impounded a great deal of water, but it wasn't good for anything. So these dams needed redoing and they were a significant flood control, and I think eventually if they ever develop ways to treat water, the water will be good. But in any event these dams needed reworking, and they were reworked. In fact they still--this has been 15 years ago I guess, and they are still working on Kemp.

He was very interested in all the water conservation all along. He and Senator Kerr, of course, worked very closely. Kerr was right across the river from my district along with the one Mr. Rayburn represented, and Wright Patman. We were the northern,

the panhandle across Texas. And so we worked with Senator Johnson and Senator Kerr a great deal on all those projects. He was always very interested in that, and REA was another thing he was always very active and interested in.

F: By '54, you're being elected for the third time, and you are also emerging as a bit of a military expert. How did the latter come about? I know in '54 you made a tour of NATO installations.

I: Yes. I don't really know. You remember that these were the times when people who had had military experience in World War II were people who had some pretty definite ideas, I know I did, about NATO and about military assistance groups around, and--

F: Of course you had a good base in your home district.

I: That's right. Then we had Shepherd Air Base in Wichita Falls, and I had a deep personal interest in it. I don't know it would be right to say that I was an expert, I would have to file a disclaimer on that. I did have strong feeling about it and did make two trips as a matter of fact I guess--one trip particularly where we went to all of the NATO countries and spent a great deal of time with their military programs and what their defense posture looked like.

F: Were you able to utilize that for any sort of general policy procedures?

I: Well, the way I used it where in conversations--I was not on the Armed Services Committee, but Paul Kilday or San Antonio was, and Paul was a very close friend of mine, in fact one of my very closest friends and I think one of the ablest men in the Congress. And I remember after coming back spending a great deal of time with Paul trying to at least give him my viewpoint. I also, as I recall, talked to Senator Johnson about it, who also was interested in military matters. So whatever influence I had was in that way rather than any personal action that I took.

F: By now Johnson is Senate Majority Leader. Did he sometimes utilize your services for what you might call "briefing sessions?"

I: Well if you use the term loosely, yes. I don't recall any formal briefings. There were two or three of us that he used to talk to a great deal; Homer Thornberry was one. I would think it is stretching the word a little to say that they were briefing sessions, but Homer was on the Rules Committee and very close to the Speaker and knew a great deal about what was going on in the House, and I know the two of us used to spend a good deal of time with him in conversation where he was obviously trying to find out what we thought.

F: You also have an interest, which is a natural from your district, in oil and gas production.

I: That's right.

F: And utilization of power, which was a general Texas concern, so I presume you talked with him from time to time about those matters.

I: I talked to him about those, yes. In the district that I represented at that time more than now, it was all either agriculture, oil and gas, and about 60 percent of the employed people I guess in the early 50's were either tied in with the oil business one way or the other. So from the economic base of the district, it was very important, and as a young lawyer, I'd been with a law firm 10 or 12 years, where I had nothing much but oil and gas practice. As a judge I would say that most of the civil cases were cases that rose out of the oil and gas business, everything from personal injury to matters affecting the title.

So I had some understanding, I think, of what the problems were as far as this particular energy source was concerned, and it was very vital to my district and it was important to the state. Senator Johnson was very interested in it, we used to talk about it a great deal, particularly in '58 I guess it was, when the basis of what is now the Trade Agreements Extension Act was passed. During that time I was very interested in it and used to confer with Senator Johnson and Mr. Rayburn a great deal about it.

F: Of course your independent oil producers are very strong in Texas. This is vital to the Texas economy.

I: That's right.

F: Now he had the problem of balancing by this time--his ambitions were getting larger and his whole platform was getting larger--he's got the problem of on the one hand of working on the loosening of trade restrictions and at the same time of protecting a vital segment of Texas economy.

I: You see the way that was resolved, and I was involved in the solution, if it is a solution, and I think it is, we developed out of that again along with Senator Kerr on the Senate side who was on the Finance Committee, what later became known as Section Seven of the Trade Agreement Act. And it's still the law. Which said in effect, and I'm paraphrasing, I can't recall the language now, but the President could if he felt the national security was in jeopardy, impose a quota system. So this was enacted and President Eisenhower then appointed a group that made findings relative to the importance of oil and gas to national security and then based on that he imposed quotas which is roughly the present system.

F: In the midst of all of this in '56, 55-56, you have the Suez crises.

I: That's right.

F: That must have involved you considerably.

I: Yes. This was a very critical period and one I never did quite understand. To digress about the domestic implication of it, I was in England along with Homer Thornberry and Gene McCarthy, and I think Barry Goldwater, I've forgotten now, there were several others.

F: Is this when you were guests of Parliament?

I: Yes. And I think Gene McCarthy and Homer and I spent one afternoon with Anthony Eden, who was then the Prime Minister of England. Of course there was at this point in time a great deal of speculation about what would happen in the Middle East. And Eden was in his office with maps and of course this was an off-the-record, I guess highly classified conference, indicated to us exactly what their reaction would be, their's being, talking to the British, the U.K.'s reaction. And what he told us there was precisely what did happen later on.

And then of course our government, as you'll recall, the then Secretary of State said they had no knowledge of this, and were somewhat horrified at the fact that the French and the British would react in such a violent way.

F: Did any of your group, as far as you know, contact the State Department?

I: No, no. This is one of those little footnotes in history. You just wonder looking back at it. We assumed and I can only speak for myself but I assume the others felt the same way, that if they would brief us that they certainly were briefing our State Department, because there was no reason for them to say anything to us that they wouldn't have said to our Ambassador or at least to somebody.

But then when our government in effect said, "Gee, we don't know anything about this," the result was that the whole course of events in the Middle East, actually I guess the whole posture of the U.K. in the Middle East has changed as a result of this rather pivotal event where the British moved then to take charge and the United States said, "No, don't do that." And they shut off the oil supplies and this sort of thing. Our government again acted without any real input from the producing parts of the oil industry. The result was we got caught in a real short position temporarily and you may remember General Thompson came to Washington.

F: Ernest O.

I: Yes, Ernest O. Thompson who was then a dominate factor of the Texas Railroad Commission, and he had been for twenty-odd years I guess. And due to the assistance, I guess, of our government, he increased the allowables in Texas some 200,000 barrels a

day as I recall, I may be wrong on some of these numbers in fact I haven't thought about it in a long time, but I think that's right.

F: Well it was by comparison almost a blank check.

I: Yes. And the result was that when this production came on stream and was able to in effect just completely destroy the effectiveness of the restrictions of the Middle East producing countries, then of course they started opening up their supplies again. And our government here didn't cut down on ours enough, so the result was it really developed quite a hardship on the domestic industry because we were left with a glut of oil that we had to absorb due to the fact that our government had not reacted as quickly as they should on either end of the crisis.

F: Did you have the feeling that they just weren't on top of the situation?

I: That's always been my feeling. I can't really think it was anything else. I certainly have no reason to think that they were inept really, or in the sense that they wouldn't act, because they did act. I've always wondered if there wasn't somehow a breakdown in communication between the then British government and the Eisenhower Administration. I don't mean a breakdown in the sense that they weren't talking, but that they weren't talking about the right things. And I think, as I say, this is one of those interesting points in history because of several things. One is it really redirected the whole history of the Middle East and then of course, not nearly as important but to some of us who are inclined to be a little sentimental about things, it ended the career of Anthony Eden, who I always thought was a very attractive, interesting man.

F: There wasn't any pressure put on the Railroad Commission to loosen its allowables? This was automatic.

I: Yes, and of course--

F: They saw the situation--

I: Yes. The fault I'm talking about, and there was one some place, I'm not prepared to place it where it was because I don't know enough about it, but the obvious failure was to communicate with the Railroad Commission to where they knew what the situation was. Because--

F: When to open up and when to close down.

I: Yes, because as soon as General Thompson got up here and had about one day of meetings, (you remember how direct he was about things) things started moving.

F: Did you meet with the General on this occasion?

I: Yes.

F: Was Senator Johnson there, can you remember?

I: Gee, I don't know. Oh, I'm sure that he was.

F: But to a certain extent this was the General's show.

I: Oh yes.

F: He'd come to rescue Europe!

I: And the United States, and the world!

F: Right.

I: But gee, I can't tell you. But my recollection is that we were all meeting, not all in the sense that everybody, but I think Mr. Rayburn and Senator Johnson and I know that I was in on several meetings, and we, that group at least, were meeting not once but several times during a period of days.

F: Any by the time of your second term as congressman, Texas has a new Senator and some people have described him as a one-issue senator, and I'm not sure but what Price Daniel would agree that he came up here in the sense to save the tidelands.

I: Yes.

F: Which fits in with this oil situation. Did, as far as you could tell, did Senator Johnson pretty well leave that to Senator Daniel to pursue in the Senate, or did he take it on as part of his general Senate problems also?

I: Well, I know Senator Johnson was very interested in it, all the Texas delegation was. I think you can generally recognize, not only by committee assignment, but by the fact that he participated in some of the court--that former governor, former attorney general--no, he wasn't former governor then--

F: Former attorney general.

I: Former attorney general, and as attorney general that he did know a lot about this question, and I wouldn't say that he turned it over to him but probably a better way to say it was everybody recognized that Price Daniel had done a great deal of work on this, and

probably knew as much about it as anyone around. And therefore he was naturally the one, and he was on the Judiciary Committee, where the matter was being considered, and through a natural sequence of events, he became the fellow that sort of spoke out on it.

F: A good bit of both official Texans and the general populace deserted the Democratic ticket in '52 and went for Eisenhower. Did this make any difference in relationships within the Texas Congressional Delegation?

I: I think it did at the time. As I said earlier, talking about this matter when I was elected to Congress, I think during the heat of the political campaign you get feelings that don't last. It's like any kind of excitement.

I never will forget, I introduced Senator Kerr in Wichita Falls upon the grounds of the municipal auditorium during that campaign and we were for the nominees of the Democratic party. And this is an exaggeration, but I think it makes a point. There were probably about 25 people there, and out of the 25 probably 24 worked for either Kerr or me, it was that kind of an audience. And we came on downtown. If you're familiar with Wichita Falls, the memorial auditorium would be out in west of the downtown area, probably 5, 6, 7 blocks and the courthouse is just a little off-center. As we came down to the then Kemp Hotel which is on the corner of 8th and Scott, we passed in front of the courthouse, and Price Daniel was speaking to a crowd on behalf of Eisenhower, there must have been 12 to 15 thousand people, I don't know. Again, I wouldn't vouch for these numbers, but the relative difference is what's important.

Well to say that Senator Kerr and I didn't have some feeling about that, but on the other hand I think most of it disappeared within a matter of a few months, and most of the people around are pros enough to know that a man that expounds the viewpoint he has but yet he doesn't necessarily take it personally. I've known Price and Jean Daniel for years, in fact I was in school with Jean. I think she's one of the greatest persons I ever knew, and while--

F: And has remained one of the prettiest!

I: Yes. Price and I have been on many sides of many different issues but I would still, at least from my standpoint, I consider him among my closest friends. I don't think this makes any difference.

F: Did your standing for Stevenson give you any trouble in your home district to speak of?

I: That's the only time in my experience that I--I didn't have any political trouble in the sense; I had an opponent I think, I know I did, but it didn't really make any difference on that score. That was the only time in my experience in public life I really got a lot of anonymous mail, anonymous phone calls, my family would get calls and this sort of thing,

you know it's unfortunate. But counting the time I was on the bench, the 15 or 18 years I was in public life this was the only time that it was really a little unpleasant at times. This doesn't mean that everyone always agreed with you.

F: Where it got kind of scurrilous.

I: Yes, and a little sticky. People were pretty unkind.

F: What were you and the other three members of that congressional delegation doing in England?

I: We were over there--this was the Interparliamentary Union. This is the Anglo American section of it, and we were over there--

F: This was in '55?

I: Yes--as the guests of the British Parliament primarily to observe their functioning in how they worked and how they operated and to see some of the activities of the British government. Then I guess it was the next year a number of those people came over here. It's a thing I assume is still going on. I think it's a very useful exchange because you get an insight into the British parliamentary system, which is completely different from ours. It's interesting, and it gave us an opportunity--we had a chance to meet and have in depth discussions with all the then leaders on all three of the significant British parties. Which was an interesting, good experience.

F: Gives you some insights into British problems.

I: One interesting thing that happened and this is not apropos of anything. As I mentioned, Gene McCarthy was along and even though we're worlds apart most of the time philosophically, we're very good personal friends. I think he's one of the most delightful men I ever knew. So they asked some of us to come down to the London School of Economics. Well we got down there and after after having met with some of the students in a very informal, very interesting sort of way, in which we were talking largely about the functions of the United States Congress, the press wanted to interview us afterwards on radio. Well, I ducked it; I didn't want it; I said "coming from part of the country I did, and I just didn't think I had much to say. Well Gene accepted the opportunity and of course gave the typical kind of McCarthy interview, which was very interesting and not held in bounds too much by facts or anything else, you know. And in any event after the interview they gave him 50 pounds. And that's the only time I learned--then for months after that, they played this interview all over the Commonwealth, Australia, Canada. Every time they'd play it they'd send him a check for either 10 pounds or 20 pounds, and this is the way I learned that the British press pays a British politician every time he's on air or TV. So they have a good thing going over there.

F: And even have a sort of residual rights.

I: That's right.

F: That is interesting. How did you come to be a co-sponsor of the bill to allow federal tax deductions for contributions to UNICEF? I would have thought that would have been outside your field of interest?

I: I guess it was really. I really can't tell you now except I was interested in UNICEF. I don't know who first--you know, I just really don't know, except most matters of the tax nature--

F: You were working with then Congressman John Lindsay on this?

I: Yes.

F: Did you work together with some frequency? Were you friends? Or was this just a case of one from each party coming in.

I: We were not really intimate in that sense, but we were, I would say, good friends. And his brother was Counsel down at Treasury, General Counsel and I really knew him better than I did John, and through him got to know John and we did collaborate a bit occasionally on things.

F: Now Wright Patman got himself in a real hassle on this matter of lifting the 4 1/2 percent ceiling on treasury bonds, and you came in with a compromise on this. How did you get in this, and what was your thinking behind it?

I: Well of course the bonds, there again this was a matter before our committee, and I felt that personally I didn't think there should be a ceiling on it, because I think it puts the government in an extremely disadvantageous position. So beginning with that viewpoint and moving over to Wright's position, and others, we were just working around trying to find some middle ground. These things evolve, you don't just all of a sudden show it to them, here it is.

F: Right. Well it continued to be an issue though, and when Eisenhower goes out and the Kennedy Administration comes in, they still come back to you for help on that.

I: That's right.

F: What did they do on that?

I: Gee, frankly I don't remember now.

- F: Well, there was a move to replace these outstanding low interest bonds--
- I: Yes, I remember that but I don't remember what the solution was.
- F: --with treasury bonds of higher interest.
- I: I remember we had quite a--I remember I was down at the White House talking about it, I don't really remember what happened.
- F: Is this, as you recall it from a standpoint of economic philosophy, is this a move to replace the bonds that are maturing with new bonds so as to draw out the payoff date? Or is it a more a matter of making the bonds competitive?
- I: Well my feeling, and I think it was the one that was prevalent at the time, was to make them competitive and to keep the money that was in bonds in bonds.
- F: You really accomplished two purposes.
- I: Yes. We were in a position then and I guess as they are now, I'm not as closely connected with it, where you were forcing all the government--not all but the tendency was to force most of the government securities into short term treasury notes or something where you had to turn them over just almost daily. So what we were looking for was a way to put a substantial portion of the debt to rest for at least 5 year, 6 year, 10 years and thinking that it would be easier to manage if you didn't look up every morning and see part of it you had to turn over at really higher rates. So I always felt that some of the people who were very much against the 4 1/2 or 4 1/4 whatever it might have been, of raising it, they were overlooking the fact that it was an open-end where they were really going much higher on the short-term credit. And the result was you put the Treasury in just an impossible task of--I've forgotten now, it's been a good while ago--but I guess in our early Kennedy years there was a time there when over 50 percent of our debt was in something like less than six months time. This was just literally driving people crazy. This was really the motivation as I recall, and certainly what I was concerned with.
- F: To go back and pick up your association with Lyndon Johnson again, he is credited with having been both a driving and a compromising force behind the first civil rights enactment of any major stature in about three-quarters of a century.
- I: I think that's right.
- F: Did he get together with the Texas congressional delegation? That is, all his work comes to naught if it stalls after it leaves the Senate.

I: Yes, he talked to a lot of us. I don't remember now how many of the Texans supported him on it, but a good many did, and we certainly heard a great deal about it. I think most people recognized the importance of making some kind of progress in this area.

It was during that time that we had what is known as the Southern Manifesto and all this business, and it was a tough period. And I think to his everlasting credit he did--I think without the drive and the force and the determination that he had that the first bill would never have been passed. I think if it had not, that this was sort of the catalyst, the plug in the drain, that once people saw that you could work in this field then everything else came.

F: Do you think in a way that it was more effectively presented and put through because of Johnson's geographical location and one of the old South states? Texas isn't truly southern--

I: Oh no, I think this had a great influence and I think as we both well know he has a lot of drive anyway. But I think this added to his determination that he would like to feel that as a Southerner he had been the man who had done this. Because I think this proves a lot of things to him, and he thought would prove lots of things to lots of people, but I don't think it did. I think it is significant that a Southern Senator did this. And I don't think there is any way that anyone other than Johnson can really have the credit for that.

F: In general, did Mr. Sam support him in this?

I: Oh yes. He couldn't have done it without Mr. Rayburn's strong support.

F: When did you begin to suspect that Mr. Johnson might be presidential timber?

I: Well, it's impossible to fix a date of course. I would think along in the latter part of the fifties--

F: You really didn't anticipate anything at the '56 convention?

I: No, and John Connally nominated him there, you know.

F: Yes, favorite son.

I: I think everybody there felt two things: one, that he wasn't a serious candidate there, but on the other hand I don't think there was anyone in the Texas delegation didn't feel like that he had the potential of becoming a very serious candidate.

F: You did think though that in '60 this might develop?

I: That's right.

F: Were you involved at all in the '60 move prior to Los Angeles?

I: Yes, yes, I was right up to my ears in it I guess. There again, not in the sense that I was a coordinator or anything, but I was working almost daily again with several of us who were trying to put together--we were working on the congressional level more than any other place.

F: Did you have a sort of unhitched candidate that you were working with? Johnson's a little difficult at times--

I: This is hard to analyze. Whether he was unwilling or whether he had a way of proceeding that he thought was better. I don't really think that's too important. The important thing is that he was reluctant. What motivated him, I don't really know. I know we had a horrible time--I don't mean horrible in the sense--

F: But you couldn't get that green light pushed.

I: Getting him really off and running. I think there was a time in the early part of the year there even, if he had really come out swinging, I think he could have been nominated. But I know even when the campaign quarters were opened here, he wouldn't even go down there as I recall for a day or two. Everything was tough. Like I say, I don't know--

F: You were not only fighting the opposition, in a sense you were having to pull the candidate along.

I: A lot of people were saying to him, and I was one of those that felt that way, then and now, that he didn't have to run but he should make it very clear that he was available.

F: Did you go to Los Angeles?

I: Yes.

F: Did you have any real optimism there?

I: Oh not really, I would say the kind of optimism was that we had the strong feeling that he was the number two candidate, and that there might be a chance--

F: If Kennedy stalled on a couple of ballots, then he might could get it.

I: Yes. We had a lot of commitments we felt like if Kennedy stalled. I think one of the very interesting little side lights to this was the vice presidency. Of course everybody's an

expert on how he became vice president, but Homer and Eloise Thornberry and my wife and I were staying out at some little hotel, I've forgotten the name of it now, it was really an apartment hotel across from the Ambassador, because it was quieter. We just liked it out there because we could get away. And we, like everyone else after the nomination the night before, we felt somewhat dejected.

F: The convention was over as far as you were concerned.

I: Yes. So we went on, and the next morning very early Gene Keogh, who was a friend of ours, Eugene Keogh, called very early and said, "What do you think about Johnson being the vice president nominee?" And I indicated that I thought he had lost his feeble mind. And he said, "Well, we've been meeting over here," they were staying at the hotel across the street, the Ambassador, and he said, "He's our choice, and we have every reason to think this will happen."

F: Now by "our choice" who is our?

I: New York, and this group was very close to the Kennedys--one of the key Kennedy states. And I really didn't think much about it. And in a short time Senator Johnson called Homer, I'm sure you've probably talked to Homer about it.

F: No, I haven't seen him yet.

I: Well anyway, I think it would be much better if you get it firsthand. But in any event he indicated to him that there had been an overture made for him to be vice president.

F: You two were kind of thunderstruck, weren't you?

I: Yes. So we got up--I'll let Homer tell you, I wasn't privy, I was there just at the telephone, I didn't--and anyway, Homer and I then hurriedly got dressed and went on down to the hotel and first went to Mr. Rayburn's room, which was down the hall if I recall from the President's, and John and Nellie Connally. Anyway we went on down and visited with Senator Johnson and he indicated that this was pretty firm by this time, this had been thirty or forty minutes.

F: Did he seem to be groping for a decision, or did he seem pretty much ready to embrace it?

I: Oh, I think he was ready to embrace it, as Homer will tell you. Homer had indicated in the initial conversation that he didn't think he ought to accept it. We talked about it and he felt then that that was bad advice, which it was. But this was the reflex of a partisan.

F: Same reflex on the part of some of the Kennedy adherents that said that he shouldn't have made the offer!

I: That's right. So anyway, we went on down and the main thing that Homer wanted to say to him, and I don't want to get into Homer's field here, was he thought that after reflecting about it that this was wrong, and that he should accept it if it were tendered to him.

F: Did you talk with Mr. Sam about this?

I: Yes.

F: Was he fairly forthright in his opinion, or was he sort of judicious and fence-riding?

I: Well at that time I would say he was probably fence-riding and probably a little more to the side of the fact that he probably shouldn't do it. But then the more he reflected on it the more he became--

F: Just as a good party matter, you think?

I: No, I think he felt for many reasons, I think he felt one--and there again it's hard to say what's in a man's mind, but I think it became the more he reflected on it, the more you realized that one, if this tender is made to you, you don't turn it down, you just can't turn it down. Now a lot of people argue, well as majority leader of the Senate he would have been more powerful than he would as vice president. Well of course they overlook the fact that he wouldn't have been majority leader of the Senate. Because even though he had been in the Senate, the new administration if he had turned them down, they probably would have been so offended that they'd have been darned sure that there was someone else majority leader, which they could have done. Plus the fact that there was an opportunity of service, and anyway I don't think he had any other choice upon reflection. I think again, in the heat of the campaign, and this had been a somewhat bitter one, that your immediate reaction is that you don't want any association with this group. But then of course--and this is Connally's reaction and he and Nellie left that morning and went somewhere in Florida I think. But I think that 18 or 20 hours there, one is, in the first place, everybody was disappointed--

F: You have a real broken rhythm there, don't you.

I: And the next time everybody's saying, "Oh, we don't want anything to do with those people and don't accept anything. We're too proud, you're too important." Then common sense begins to get a hold of you and reason begins to prevail, and you say, "Gee, a man really if he is a big man, can't turn these things down. And if you are really interested in being of service and all these things you say you are then you've got to accept whatever opportunities come to you."

F: You of course are busy with your own campaign, do you get involved much in the national campaign?

I: Yes, I was involved very much. I went with Mr. Rayburn that fall--in fact I was very much involved in it. My wife traveled with Mrs. Johnson.

F: As I recall the Kennedy sisters and Mrs. Johnson came to Wichita Falls also.

I: And Jane, my wife, went with them. She was gone about six weeks with several different groups all over the country, and she'd go with a few of the Kennedys and Mrs. Johnson or something. I traveled largely with Mr. Rayburn part of the time, and then George Smathers and I, who was on the Finance Committee and had sort of a business oriented image and I guess I did, and we were going around speaking to business groups, telling them that Kennedy and Johnson didn't have horns, and they really understood some of the problems in the business community.

And then another jaunt I made was with Senator Bob Byrd of West Virginia and he took his guitar and we went out and spoke to the cattle people, the farmers and agricultural people, who I was also supposed to have some \_\_\_\_\_, so I had a busy fall.

F: Was the religious issue pretty deep?

I: Yes, I think it was.

F: Did you take it on headfirst or did you ignore it?

I: I think this is one of the things that the nominee handled pretty much. I know in our case, we just alluded to his meeting in Houston and other places.

F: Did you find the presence of Johnson on the ticket a reassurance to people with whom you were dealing?

I: Yes, very much so.

F: You got the distinct impression that Johnson did strengthen the ticket?

I: Yes. And I think there were places for instance that George Smathers and I went, and I went on other occasions, that--and I don't think this had anything to do with us--but I think with Johnson, that we could not have gone to if we had been representing Kennedy alone. I mean these were business people. I think there were certainly elements in business that the Kennedys had contacts with and there were other elements that were just scared to death of him, as you well know. And this was a group that we could talk to. How much good we did I don't know.

And then on the religious issue, Bob Byrd who is really a very sincere and dedicated fellow and what I am about to say I don't want to be--but he's a shouting, singing, foot-stomping kind of Baptist. And he can really get the job done.

F: He can issue that invitation and the sinners will come down, huh!

I: Yes. And he doesn't drink and he doesn't smoke and he's really a very fine person, but he can talk to a lot of the people that were greatly concerned about the religious issue. And while we did not talk about it directly much, or if we did as I say, we'd just allude to what the presidential nominee--

F: Kind of a reassurance that if Bob Byrd stands for it, it must be all right.

I: Here was a kind of fellow that reacted in a religious sort of way, precisely as they did, and if he could be for him then he was bound to be not so bad.

F: Curiously enough of course, the successor of Senator Johnson as senator came from your district.

I: That's right.

F: Had you known John Tower fairly well?

I: I have known John very well. You see I was associated for 10 or 11 years with a law firm of which Orville Bullington was a member, the senior member.

F: I knew Orville, incidentally.

I: And you know without me telling you that he and Mr. Creager ran the Republican Party in Texas, I guess, "which even the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Well John Tower married Lue Bullington, and her father is Grover Bullington who is in the insurance business, but their office was right next to us. And John Tower's father was pastor of the First Methodist Church there. Of course Lue, I've known her ever since she was just a little bitty girl, just right up around on that floor where we all officed and she was in to see Uncle Orville and all that business. And John almost the same way.

And again, I think this is one of those happenstances. John had run for the state legislature and been defeated the summer before he was elected to the United States Senate in the fall. And not without taking anything from John, or get into any discussion about that, I think if he had not accepted the Republican nomination for United States Senate which no one wanted, and (William Merritt) Steger down in Tyler and two or three others turned it down, he wouldn't any more be in the Senate today, because it was that

exposure that he got that then allowed him to come back, he was known and come back in the special election and on a high man deal, win.

F: Without knowing it he was actually running for the second race the first go-around.

I: That's right. And the fact that he introduced the Republican candidate around over Texas, made a lot of speeches and all that was really the thing that elected him the second time.

F: When you resigned from Congress and went with the American Petroleum Institute, did you talk at all with the vice president about getting out of political life?

I: Yes, I talked to him about it. And this was not an easy decision for me. I talked to him at length about it, not in the sense--that he would control what I would do, but I did talk to him about just as one friend to another. And I think anyone who gets into the Congress of the United States, which I think is really a great experience, whether you serve one term or fifty, but if you are married and have a family there comes a time when you have to make either a complete commitment or get out. And the economics of the office have changed a good deal in the last 10 years, and I think it was necessary that they had to, because otherwise--I was reaching the point where I had two sons and they were coming on to approaching college age and this is expensive, as you well know. And another thing, there hadn't been a year--I'd been fortunate enough though having two or three opportunities that I was able to make a little money in my early life, plus little inheritances to where I was not a wealthy man, but I had a little outside. There was not a year that I had been in Congress that I hadn't had to dip into that. I never did really make expenses, and this troubles you.

F: You're kind of living on your own deferred payment.

I: That's right. So you just reach the point you know to say, "Gee, this is fun, I enjoy it, it's challenging and all that, but I've got children to educate and I'm getting older and what am I going to do?" So anyway, it was not an easy decision and I talked to Vice President Johnson several times about it, and I talked to Homer Thornberry about it. The only person I didn't talk to about it was Mr. Rayburn, simply because he wouldn't talk to me about it! I tried to several times.

F: He couldn't believe anybody would want to do anything other than that, could he?

I: No. But anyway it was not an easy decision and one that--I think Homer reached much--I know he did, because we were going through this at the same time, we had much the same sort of family commitments except he had one more child than I did. And he was faced with the same thing.

F: The Vice President, in a sense, understood and sympathized with what you were facing?

I: That's right. As I say, I don't recall that he ever really said, you ought to do this, or you ought to do that, but we talked about it, talked about the alternatives and the options he had open and this sort of thing.

F: That law class just before and just after that you were in, you graduated in '37, contained some people who have been around in Texas public life a long time, like Jake Pickle and John Connally and so on. So you would have known John Connally very well through the years, and events would have kept you together. You will recall when he came back and ran for governor and resigned as Secretary of the Navy, that one of the slogans was "LBJ, Lyndon's Boy John." Did you get the feeling that Johnson did want him to go home and run, or was this strictly an independent decision on Connally's part, that he had had enough time in Washington?

I: I think it was an independent decision.

F: He wasn't Lyndon's candidate in a sense for the governorship?

I: I don't think anyone can know John Connally very well, and I have known John longer than I have known the President, and I'm known him in many ways much more intimately. I don't think anybody that's ever known John Connally very well can say that he would ever be anybody's boy in the sense that he would be subservient. I know I sat around and I remember Joe Kilgore and I spent an evening with him when he lived out here on Foxhall Road, and we talked most of one night. Joe and I trying to get him to go make this run for governor and I remember several other occasions.

I think this was a decision that I'm sure John talked to the Vice President about, he had to because he was open--I think John made the decision himself, he and Nellie did. Well, to answer your question, I think it was one they independently reached. I'm sure they consulted with the Vice President, I know they did, I know a number of others around town here that were good friends of theirs talked to him about it. And we followed the campaign, did what we could here and there to help, and you know, everybody was interested.

F: After November of '63 you had Johnson as President. Does that make any difference at all in your relationship with him, other than the fact being President makes a difference in anybody's relationship.

I: No, I don't think so.

F: You found him basically as approachable and as easy to work with as ever?

I: Frankly I never did try to approach him much after he became President. Not because I had any hesitancy about it, but I am somewhat in awe of that job.

F: Of the office.

I: Of the office. Just the terrible responsibility. So whatever problems I had, I don't recall all the time he was in the presidency ever talking to him other than in a social way, but I mean as far as getting up on to go see him. I did go on a couple of occasions at his invitation, where he would say, "I want to know about this, will you come over?"

F: Now you're going to be involved with his administration simply because among other things you've got this matter of oil import quotas and you've got the Interior very active in oil.

I: This is a good example. I knew Stewart Udall intimately from our having served in the House with him, well, I dealt with Stewart--

F: So you didn't need actually to use the President in this.

I: No. Now I used to go over to the White House. Mrs. Johnson and the President would on occasion call my wife and me and ask us to come down and we'd come up and have dinner and sit around and talk. I'm not suggesting that we didn't talk about oil matters, we talked the whole gamut of whatever the question of the day was, and he seemed to enjoy having an opportunity visiting with someone that he at least felt like wasn't trying to sell him anything. Well, we talked about everything in the world. And as a matter of fact, he was out at my house the night before he made that speech in which he said he would not be a candidate.

F: Did you have any idea that night--

I: I was just going to say, and he was out there--Horace Busby and I were talking about it last night. I don't know, he must have been out there until 2 o'clock in the morning and I knew he was troubled about it, not troubled--I didn't know what it was and I thought he'd tell me if he wanted to--this was the kind of relationship. I respected the fact--and we sat out there as I say, practically all night, and this kind of contact we had relatively frequently, I'd say maybe once a month or once every six weeks or something.

F: The Johnson Administration to a great extent was the first one to bring air pollution--you've had pollution as a problem of national concern for some time, but air pollution is really a product of the 60's as a matter of concern. And of course the API leadership set aside a \$1,800,000 in the '66 budget for research in pollution.

Now then, did you work with the Interior Department on this or were you work independently to arrive at your own ideas?

- I: We were working not with the President--I doubt that he was aware of--we were caught up in a genuine concern about all these environmental things and we talked to the Department of Interior and to HEW. I can't now call the name of the man--of course John Middleton, who's still over there was one of the fellows who came in shortly. But there was a fellow that preceded John-- [Vernon McKenzie]
- F: I don't know.
- I: I can't either now, but anyway this was, I would say, something we talked primarily with Interior and HEW and to some degree we were motivated just by our own interest in the problem. And we were more connected with the Johnsons on this thing that Bird had about cleaning up, and she was the one who really got me in that, she and Liz Carpenter. But this air pollution business was kind of a three-way thing. We were interested in it, and HEW was interested in it.
- F: Well of course another developing interest, which is now became a concern during the 60's is this matter of off-shore oil exploration and development. Again, did you work closely with Interior on this?
- I: Interior almost exclusively. I don't recall, there again having had--this is the sort of thing we would work with Udall completely.
- F: HEW put out a recommendation for some sort of strong interstate agency to speed the use of low sulfur fuels. Did you get involved in this?
- I: Yes, very much.
- F: Who did you work with on this?
- I: There again, this man--
- F: Same man?
- I: Same man--let me find out who he is. I'm just blank on it, can't think who it was. And we were working in those days too with cities like New York and other places that were making regional requirements on low-sulfur.
- F: Does the API interest encompass the shale oil fuels?
- I: Yes.
- F: Has that been much of a problem for you from a political standpoint?

I: No, it's been no problem at all for us politically because we've held the view and still hold it that while we've done a lot of work on it--I say "we", I mean the member companies--we held the view that shale oil is not going to be a significant factor until the economics are such that you can justify probably a dollar more a barrel for oil, or seventy-five cents a barrel anyway. So we think it's great to have this reserve, to have means of producing it, but we don't feel that as far as being able to develop it this year or next year and contrary to public belief, we're not hot to get somebody a big permit or lease on it because we don't think there's any known process that can put it into market at a competitive price. Plus the fact that you have all kinds of environmental problems with this. You've got to find out what you're going to do with this--I think shale is significant, probably twenty-five to forty years from now--

F: To get back to sulfur content for a moment, is it practicable to get the sulfur content down to that one percent?

I: Yes, and they're building plants and have built plants. You see this is large Venezuelan oil to where that's being done.

And fortunately there are significant discoveries like some of this Libyan oil that meets it naturally.

F: And it is low content.

I: Yes. And most of this Alaskan.

Vernon McKenzie was the man's name. And he was at that time in charge of air and water pollution problems in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. I didn't personally get involved in this much because we have a senior vice president by the name of P. N. Gammelgard who has this responsibility on sulfur fuels and Vernon McKenzie was the man he worked with.

F: Did the establishment of a Department of Transportation affect you in a sense that pipelines are a form of transportation?

I: Well they affected us in that we generally, I think, I don't recall--we were glad to have some place to go. Pipelines were sort of orphans, in that ICC did some things about them and somebody else did something else--

F: Everybody had a little parcel of it.

I: And so we were generally glad to see that--

F: There was no conflict here then between procedures?

I: We worked closely with the Coast Guard too. If there was a conflict--the Coast Guard wanted to stay in Treasury at the time, and I guess we shared that viewpoint.

F: Did the Machiasport, free port, idea give you much of a problem? I presume that's how you pronounced it.

I: The free port gave us no problem at all. We had no concern or feeling one way or the other about the--but what gave us a great problem was the fact that as we viewed this exemption, that it would be a subsidy to one oil company to the tune of about 50 million dollars a year, and that concerned us a great deal to the point that we got hysterical!

F: Is Occidental a member of the API?

I: No.

F: How do you think Occidental got in that position?

I: I have no way of knowing. I would assume that Machiasport is a logical place for a large terminal of some kind, a refinery or something, because it's a deep water harbor. And the irony of it is it will probably become a very significant harbor if this Alaskan oil moves around through the Northwest passage. So this makes a lot of sense. The people in New England, as any consuming group would be, are concerned about the prices they pay for fuel, and this is understandable. And add to that the fact that Occidental had great new reserves in Libya, which they needed a market for. So I don't think there is anything sinister or evil about the Occidental operation, I think they simply put together a package that from their standpoint was great, because it gave them a market for their oil, they could build political support of a substantial region that they were going--

F: They've got a natural constituency.

I: Natural constituency. So it all made great sense. But when you looked at it from our vantage point, we didn't share that view.