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HARRY MCPHERSON ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW VIII

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Signed by Harry McPherson on August 8, 1997

Accepted by John Carlin, Archivist of the United States on September 5, 1997

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ACCESSION NUMBER 97-5

## BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: HARRY MCPHERSON

Lawyer; b. Tyler, Tex., Aug. 22, 1929; B.A., U. South, 1949; D.C.I. (hon), 1965; student Columbia, 1949-50; LL.B., U. Tex., 1956; admitted to Texas bar, 1955; asst. gen. counsel Democratic policy com., U.S. Senate, 1956-59; asso. counsel, 1959-61; gen. counsel, 1961-63; dep. under sec. internat. affairs Dept. Army, 1963-64; asst. sec. state ednl. and cultural affairs, 1964-65; spl. asst. and counsel to Pres. Johnson, 1965-66; spl. counsel to Pres. Johnson, 1966-69; private practice law, Washington, 1969-.

## INTERVIEW VIII

DATE: November 20, 1985

INTERVIEWEE: HARRY McPHERSON

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. McPherson's office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

G: Let's start with [1958], and the first elements of 1958 seem to be a lot of questions about defense.

M: Yes.

G: You see a lot of elements of the arms race in here and questions of whether our defense was strong enough. There seemed to be a little bit of partisan politics here, with the Democrats arguing that more money needed to be spent on defense. Let me ask you to assess this issue as it stood in 1958.

M: My really curbside view of it--because I was still only two to three years into working for Johnson, and the persons who advised him on major issues were George Reedy and Gerry Siegel and such persons, not me. But I had the distinct impression that Johnson was trying to capitalize on the defense issue politically and at the same time was trying to show himself not as being bellicose but as being large in scope, so far as foreign relations were concerned. I think he was beginning to build a national reputation, wishing to build a national reputation in the foreign policy field, as somebody who had a big head and an ability to look after the country. As I wrote in my book [*A Political Education*], the first responsibility of government is to protect its citizens. Senator [Richard] Russell and Senator [John] Stennis and those senators who dealt with defense issues were dealing with that primary responsibility, and Johnson allied himself with them and worked on the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee as its chairman, [and] had been on the Naval Affairs Committee in the House. I think his defense work emerged from a natural interest, a feeling that this is something that very much needed to be looked at to avoid another Munich. He had that experience very much in his mind, the experience of Guam and rearming in 19[41] and continuing the draft. He was a strong man and at the same time, under whose tutelage I don't know, he was trying to give the country the feeling of someone who had ideas, bold ideas, about reducing the dangers of the arms race, even so that he was--the open-skies proposal and things like that were advanced to show the largeness of his vision.

But there was certainly a lot of use made of military officers like [James] Gavin

and others who complained about the weakness of our forces. He had gone to extraordinary lengths, Johnson had, to pound on the Pentagon in the question of space and did as much as anybody, I believe, to make them seem shortsighted, unable to comprehend the importance of the Russian space shot, with those hearings and with getting a Donald Quarles on the stand to betray the administration's small-minded view of what the space race was going to be about.

G: How did LBJ perceive the administration in this respect? Did he perceive them as being small-minded or myopic?

M: I think so. I think he did. At the same time, you have, I believe, his very complex view of Eisenhower. I think he regarded Eisenhower as a man who was almost sublimely ignorant of many important things that politicians and people in a supremely political job like the presidency ought to know; he thought Eisenhower did not know [them]. He didn't have exactly contempt for Eisenhower, but he didn't have much respect for his judgment in some important fields.

At the same time, he could read the polls and he knew how people back in Texas felt about Eisenhower--Eisenhower had carried it handsomely both times--and he took great pains not to seem captious or to be nipping at Eisenhower. He justified that with his fellow Democrats, despite the displeasure of Mrs. Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman and people like that, Walter Reuther, on the grounds that the country should speak with one voice abroad. And we had a lot of [crises]; this was at the time when Ike was meeting or had met with Khrushchev, when we were putting troops into Lebanon and so on. Johnson said, "I don't want the Democrats to be in a position of shortchanging the administration or crippling them as they deal with these overseas crises." I think he genuinely felt that. But he felt, I think, even more that Ike was terribly popular and it would be awful politics for the Democrats in general and for Johnson in particular to attack him or to subvert him in any way.

G: To what extent do you think his support of the space program was based on publicity? Do you think that this was a factor, or do you think it was really a genuine interest in exploring space for scientific or defense reasons?

M: I don't know and there's no point in my speculating. I didn't know at the time. I didn't know whether this was something that someone had convinced Johnson was going to be a very big thing, and if he got on board early he would be glad he had. The hearings were run with [the] full glare of publicity. He had Gerry Siegel and some others drafting the NASA act, and he learned that statute well enough to put it through, to handle it on the floor. I don't know if he ever knew the specific technological details of missilery, but he knew enough to handle it as an organizational matter. But the fundamental question you're asking, why he got onto the space business, I don't know, except that somebody had obviously persuaded him that it was an issue whose time would come and he would be well placed to be there early. It may have been it had something to do with some military contractors, because we know that during the Kennedy years, when Johnson was vice president, that Houston was chosen to be the space center, and I have no doubt that

Johnson had something to do with that.

G: Any firsthand evidence there or was this just--?

M: No, just a feeling that if he were looking for a place to put the space center, there were a lot of places to put it. It didn't necessarily have to be Houston for any geological or meteorological reason, as far as I know.

G: The only question is--historians are likely to wonder how much of it was Lyndon Johnson and how much was Albert Thomas.

M: Well, the two in that case, they made a pretty potent combination.

G: Do you recall the Preparedness Committee's interest in getting the Gaither Report from the White House?

M: Yes, I just remember that; I don't recall anything more about it. They certainly used it, Johnson used it, as a club to beat up the administration with.

G: Do you think he saw military build-up as sort of a public works project during this recessionary period? Do you think part of his enthusiasm for it was to pump more money into the economy and put people to work?

M: Well, certainly on the civil works side, the Corps of Engineers side, so far as that puts that construction money to work. But the defense contractor business is not one that you can really flip on and flip off like a light switch and produce a lot of jobs overnight. You do a better job of getting jobs, particularly to the sort of people who are likely to be unemployed, by highway construction, dams, civil works of that kind. But it's very likely that he did see the political value in pumping a lot of money into defense contractors; political value because it had economic--it had financial consequences. There was a resolution, which I saw referred to here, that I think I helped draft that called on the administration to speed up the dispensation of funds under contracts, both military and civilian contracts, that called for construction. It was a way, without adding to the budget deficit--or deficit or not, without adding a lot of spending. On the surface, the result of it would certainly have been to add spending, because it said speed it up. So the purpose of it was to get money that was to be spent in what we now call the out years and spend it this year, and that resolution passed as an anti-recession spending measure.

One thing that I find interesting, and I think maybe your chronology here gives the reason, is Johnson's resistance to the idea of tax cuts as an antirecession measure. He was for big spending in response to recession, and part of that I guess is just the classic New Deal and southwestern, midwestern, southern, western interest in public works--the pork barrel--as a way of getting money out to the folks, that you put a lot of people to work out there. Johnson, after all, had begun his career in the National Youth Administration and even before that had worked with his daddy on some highways down near Buda. I remember his famous story of the highway engineer. So he really came from a part of the

country where it was much more effective to get federal dollars in to pay for construction than it was to cut taxes. [The] notion of tax cutting as an antirecessionary device is not one that had seeped down to Texas, as I believe I think it's fair to say. Senator [Paul] Douglas, who was at this time in their lives Johnson's almost daily adversary, was a professional economist and it was his view that the way the recession should be attacked was in some small part by spending but in large part by tax cuts, that would really kick the machine and get it started again. Johnson was dead set against it. The answer that may be the right one as to why he was dead set against it is Robert Anderson, the secretary of the Treasury under Eisenhower, who was from Texas, a Republican but somebody who had always been close to the establishment down there. The suggestion is that he had swayed Johnson to--"Whatever you do, don't cut taxes; don't reduce revenues. We need the revenues so that we don't have to go out and"--probably--"we don't have to go out and borrow another billion dollars," in those wonderful, innocent days when a billion dollars would have been a lot.

(Interruption)

- G: You mentioned the case of General Gavin. Was there a difficulty in getting generals or other people within the government to speak out openly criticizing the administration?
- M: Well, there always is difficulty in getting people to do that from within, but the game that's always gone on in the Congress, I guess goes on today in its own way, is that of trying to get people from the Pentagon who have credibility in the public mind to say that we need X or Y, that we are being badly served by the absence of a certain kind of military hardware, or by our strategic plans or whatever, in the hope that you'll get them changed that way. We just had a great example with [Caspar] Weinberger's letter to Reagan. The Pentagon is a sieve; it always has been, and it's been used by the party in power in the Congress, usually, used by Democratic members like Johnson and [Stuart] Symington and others in those days to show that the Eisenhower Administration, while it has the reputation because it's headed by a five-star general of being very alert to national security needs, really isn't. It's not taking care of us as it should.

Remember that in 1953 Charles Wilson of General Motors had come in as secretary of defense, and he said his purpose was to give us a bigger bang for the buck. I remember that vividly because I was one of seventeen lieutenants in air force headquarters in Europe who were given the option of leaving the military short of our term, our commitment, and we all did. They were going to get a bigger bang for less, get rid of the bucks they were paying us. So they came in with an efficiency expert, and the Democrats--Johnson with his Naval Affairs background in the House and serving on the Armed Services Committee; Senator Russell running the Armed Services Committee and running the southern caucus, Symington with his background in the air force--the Democrats had a number of people with a strong legislative military background. When there were these efficiency cuts that were going on, they seized the opportunity to say that the country is being undercut, is losing, and that Eisenhower and these Republicans are not what they're cracked up to be.



G: In retrospect, do you think that there actually was a missile gap or a question of inferiority here?

M: No. I mean, I don't think so. We have always had more hardware than the Russians; they've always had more troops than we. That's been kind of the basic thing, that and the fact that both of us, since a fairly early period in our struggle, have had the ability to destroy each other. So we've been in this scorpions-in-the-bottle position ever since.

G: One interesting element that flows through some of the memoranda of this year is that LBJ seems to be very dissatisfied with his job, that he is toying with the idea of resigning as majority leader. I just wonder if you were aware of that?

M: I was not in the slightest aware of it. First time I'd ever seen it, and I would think that you would want to talk to both Reedy and to Horace Busby, who has known Johnson throughout this period, and then later of course helped him write his "I will not run again" speech in 1968. But there was an element in Johnson that having reached a particular point, and then as he used to put it, when a rooster sticks his head above the grass, people throw rocks at it, and he was a rooster sticking his head above the grass. He was a leader and then was a president, and in both cases [was] roundly attacked and denounced and wanted out. He didn't see any future in staying as president. But as majority leader, this is all news to me. I didn't know that he had that feeling.

G: I wondered to what extent it was simply going through the motions of just vocalizing his frustrations rather than a serious consideration.

M: I do, too. I don't know the answer to that. In 1956 he and [Sam] Rayburn said they wanted really nothing to do with the Democratic Advisory Council that had been set up, and it took me a long time--I was very disappointed. As a new fellow up here I thought that it would be great if Johnson showed that he was a real national Democrat and would deal with Mrs. Roosevelt and Walter Reuther and Adlai Stevenson and so on. I mean, it's classic Texas insecurity. It was like one's pleasure at being well regarded by Harvard men who thought you were bright even though you were from Texas. I kind of had the feeling that it would be nice if Johnson and Rayburn sat down with these wonderfully attractive liberal leaders and made policy for the Democratic Party.

Well, Johnson and Rayburn knew and understood, as I did not at that time, that to come down in the morning to a meeting of the Democratic Advisory Council and to take positions on various things that almost inevitably--race and other such things--[take] fixed positions and say "the Democrats stand here," and then to go back to the Hill and seek in any way to carry out that policy would have been suicidal to the Democrats on the Hill. What would you have done with the ten southern committee chairmen? How would you have explained to them that you've been down taking these liberal positions and if you were a Democrat, that's what you believed in? They would have found it very easy to say, "So long, we're going across the aisle," or "We're going to form our own little independent cabal."

So he wanted nothing to do with that advisory council. I think that began or that certainly emphasized the gap between him and people like Herbert Lehman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and so on, who saw Johnson precisely because of the very reasons that made him most successful as majority leader--his ability to work with the southerners and to keep them from going over to join the Republicans--was what made them just outraged that their leader was in bed with the right wing of the Democratic Party, the people who had always voted against antilynching laws and things like that. It was probably a situation in which Johnson thought there was not going to be any relief, it was just going to be a constant fight to stay on top of this, that he was going to be attacked just daily. And indeed, within the Senate there was [Wayne] Morse and later [William] Proxmire and people like that who began to attack him for being too much of an authoritarian ruler. That was enough, I guess, at some point just to make him feel to hell with it.

G: Did you yourself detect any difference in his mood between 1956 when you first came and 1958 and 1959?

M: Well, you had the sense that he surely must be planning to make the big run.

G: Why did you sense that?

M: Well, it was unavoidable; the papers, the columns were filled with it almost every day. It was just assumed that Johnson would be the kind of southern, conservative candidate. George Reedy did his best to expand that range of admiration of admirers, and he did very well. There were a lot of newspaper columns and editorials that said, "The most effective, the most capable man in the Democratic Party is Lyndon Johnson; he ought to be the Democratic candidate." It was just around you everywhere. Occasionally I would see some of the old Democratic regulars like Tom Corcoran go into Johnson's office in the evening. I assume they were in there to talk about--and Jim Rowe--the future. Symington was obviously coming up as a potential [candidate]. [Hubert] Humphrey was coming up. And Jack Kennedy.

G: The details in some of these memoranda of what LBJ might do to ease his problems if he decides to stay on as majority leader, I guess hint at some of the problems themselves. One is turn the floor over to [Mike] Mansfield more often, and another is to delegate more to other senators and to his staff, saving himself for the really big issues and questions. Specifically, "Let [Robert] Kerr tangle with [John] Williams." You had a passage in your book about John Williams.

M: John Williams was a thorn in everybody's side. He was a high-voiced pain in the tail who had the right answer for everything and was always laying into everyone for their shortcomings, the implication being that they were all corrupt. He frequently blocked things that others had supported. Johnson used to say, and I think in my oral history I talked about how much I admired Johnson's ability to swallow and put behind him after a time, the roadblocks and the difficulties that some people unjustifiably gave him. He would work out a unanimous consent agreement so he could finally get the Senate to vote at a certain hour after debate. Then he had the presiding officer put the agreement to the

Senate and old Williams would object. Johnson would sit down, his face crumpled, and then he'd get up and stalk out of the place and go into his office. In about five minutes though he'd come back, and drawing on his nasal inhaler, he would go over and sit down next to Williams and start talking to him, usually staring at the ceiling as he talked and then turning on Williams with nose to nose. And after a while he'd get up and put the same unanimous consent agreement, with a few more hours perhaps given to Williams' side, or some special arrangement so that there would be some reason that Williams could show for having changed his mind, and it would be agreed to. But the ability to focus on the task, on getting the job done and not on your emotions, not on permitting your emotions to tie you up, Johnson had that for the most part.

G: I notice here that he assigned or saw that Proxmire got a seat on Agriculture. Proxmire soon became another thorn, I guess, in Johnson's side.

M: Yes.

G: Let me ask you to describe their early relationship.

M: All I remember is that Johnson was--when Proxmire won a special election out there--he was on the phone with him and he met him at the airport and he treated him like a king, and Proxmire was embarrassing in his praise of Johnson. I mean, I'm not sure Johnson found it embarrassing, [but] I did, to hear this lavish praise heaped on Johnson by Proxmire--about the most minuscule things. God, Johnson would announce that there would be a three-day recess and then they'd have a calendar call and Proxmire would say, "Mr. President, just one more example of the brilliant leadership of the Majority Leader" and so on.

And then suddenly it just turned in 1958. I'm not sure what turned it. Almost--it was put on the basis of some grand objection on Proxmire's part to the authoritarianism of Johnson, but you never know. Wayne Morse once made a thundering speech against Johnson and his brutal style of leadership or whatever, I forget what it was, and it turned out that Wayne Morse had accepted a speaking engagement in Oregon that would pay him a couple of thousand dollars and Johnson had scheduled a vote on [that day]. Morse asked him to change it and Johnson said, "I can't! Everybody else is lined up." So Morse went out and made this thundering speech, all in the grand concepts of democracy and individual rights and authoritarianism and so forth, and it all had to do with having to give up that speech. So I don't know what it was that really caused Proxmire--I'm cynical now. Having seen Morse in that role, I'm cynical about what people--what's really on their minds.

G: Was Johnson more inclined to excuse Morse than he was Proxmire?

M: Oh, sure. He liked Morse, and part of it had to do with their bucolic interests. They both had cattle, and Johnson and Morse and Kerr and Clinton Anderson all did a lot of talking about their horses and their cattle, and I think they did some trading of them. All that built a tie between them that he didn't have with Proxmire.

G: Okay. I have a lot of issues. Is there anything there that--?

M: Well, a couple of things. One, on June 13 of 1958 there is a description of the fight over labor legislation. This was John Kennedy kind of versus [John] McClellan and [Barry] Goldwater, a more conservative labor bill. There was one wonderful night--I can't recall where it was in here, but it was during debate on a labor bill in which McClellan, who labor considered an arch-foe, kept trying to insist upon a labor bill of rights. And God, Holmes Alexander and all the conservative columnists and others were all writing about this. This was going to be the real test, whether the Senate would stand up against the dictatorial labor leadership that was in power at the time and stand up for the individual union member. And the Senate passed it after Johnson and Kennedy and others fought it. Kennedy explained why it was a bad idea. The labor federation just was determined to kill it, because what it meant was that the minority in various unions would be able just to sandbag and sabotage anything that was done by the majority, using this bill of rights. They could tie the union in knots and get them in litigation forever.

Well, one part of it, one right in the bill of rights, had something to do with guaranteeing membership in the union to anyone regardless of race, color, creed, whatever. This again was to prevent local union leadership from keeping people out of the union who might give it trouble. It was McClellan's purpose and Goldwater's purpose to give them trouble. And Jim Wilson, my colleague as one of the counsels of the Democratic Policy Committee, a very bright lawyer from Texas, discerned in that particular right what amounted to an FEPC [Fair Employment Practices Commission]. It was like saying that if you're black, you get to be in the union, and that means that we're on our way toward a federal requirement that nobody be denied employment on the grounds of race. In 1958 that was a hot issue; we didn't have Title VII of the Civil Rights Act at that time.

Jim told Johnson that after the vote, which Johnson was very sorry to have lost because he had worked hard with Kennedy and with the labor unions to try to get it in shape. And he listened to Jim with eyes open and he said, "Go write that up," and Jim ran in, wrote it up, wrote up his argument that it really could be used as a fair employment practices act, where the federal government was insisting that blacks had the right to work. He brought that down and Johnson took it around to McClellan and said, "Look what you've done! Look what you've done!" McClellan was horrified, and he got his own lawyers and they sat at the back of the chamber, and the next day--the Senate was out of session at the time--the next day when it got back in session, McClellan moved to reconsider his own amendment and to table his own amendment, because he was damned if he was going to have that name as being the guy who had stumbled into a fair employment practices act.

G: Evidently there was also an amendment by [William] Knowland that LBJ had blocked, working with the machinists union [inaudible]. Do you remember that one?

M: No. One of those labor bills, I remember a funny moment. I was up in the Senate gallery.

The debate was over and there were just the concluding speeches. I went up late in the evening. George Reedy was sitting next to Andy Biemiller, the AFL-CIO's lobbyist, and the bill, as it had been fought through, had become finally an acceptable bill to the union. They decided it was a good thing for them to be on the side of some kind of labor reform, they shouldn't be just--and as they started to vote, suddenly Biemiller, a great big guy, very fat guy, jumped up and said, "Jesus Christ, I forgot to tell Molly that he could vote aye!" This very conservative Republican senator, Molly [George] Malone, was a sure vote for the labor unions any time they told him, and they had told him, "We have got to fight off these amendments; we've got to fight off this bill." That was at the beginning. They never went back to him; and he voted consistently against every amendment on behalf of labor. But at the end they hadn't told him it's okay, and by the time Biemiller got down into the lobby and was calling in to see Senator Malone, they got to his name and he voted no, and it was the only vote against this bill. I mean, every body was for the bill except Molly Malone.

I see on August 13 that the Senate passes the National Defense Education Act. That was one of the big results of the space business. We decided we didn't have enough mathematicians and people interested in science, so we would have a National Defense Education Act. The bill was much changed in committee, and all the scholarships were taken out of it except for one section in which they were more or less hidden. It was the loan program, national defense loans, student loans, but there was one where that--it may have been easy forgiveness of the loan. It really amounted to a scholarship for certain students. They were going to sneak it through because John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky--

Tape 1 of 1, Side 2

M: John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky was dead set against the federal government making any money available for scholarships. He got up and asked Lister Hill of Alabama, the chairman of the committee, whether there was any money in this bill for scholarships. And Hill gave one of his classic Lister Hill answers: "Why, Mr. President, there's no man that's a greater friend of the student than the Senator from Kentucky, and I want to tell you in this bill we've got these loans that could be called the John Sherman Cooper Loans"--he went on like this avoiding the question. Hubert Humphrey came in and was full of Humphrey. He was absolutely just flying high: Here was the first higher education act of the federal government in many, many [years], ever since the Land Grant College Act, practically. And he made a Hubert Humphrey speech, and he said, "What's more, we're not only going to fight back"--the Russians, you know--"we're not only going to have student loans, we're going to have scholarships, and in section so-and-so we've got scholarships"--and Cooper interrupted him and said, "That's the question I was asking a while ago. This will make it possible for scholarships to be granted these students?" and Humphrey said, "Yes!" Humphrey hadn't heard that--he didn't know. Cooper moved to strike it out and, sure enough, the section was struck out. Lister Hill was staring at his feet, just shaking his head. He had worked so hard to sneak this thing in there, and Humphrey with his exuberance had exposed it and it resulted in striking it out.

- G: Anything on LBJ and the National Defense Education Act? Did he see it as an education measure?
- M: Yes. Oh, yes. He was hot for it. It was terrific. He, even in those days, was quick to talk about education as the solution to all of man's problems.
- G: It seems that so often here the education bills were tied up with antisegregation riders, particularly school construction and things like that. Do you recall this element?
- M: That was the so-called Powell amendment, the Adam Clayton Powell amendment, that was always put up and always voted down. It was one of those things that brought about an obligatory several speeches on both sides, and then there would be a vote and it would be excised with the explanation that everybody knows this will kill the program or kill the bill or whatever. Of course that, the substance and thrust of the Powell amendment, is now what is known as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which says that no federal funds shall go to any program or agency that discriminates on grounds of race or sex.
- G: You talked about the space program and the result of the National Defense Education Act coming out of the hearings. Did you have any insights about the choice of subsequently setting up a civilian control of the space program rather than putting it in the Defense Department? Is this something that LBJ was actively concerned about?
- M: I don't remember. The guy who came back from Harvard really to work on that was Gerry Siegel, so you should talk to him about it.
- G: Have you got something else there that [inaudible]?
- M: I haven't got that far yet, no. I tell you what, let me look--this is very interesting. Maybe I should look it over and the next time you come I'll have some. . . .
- G: There's one note from 1958 that concerns something that happened back in 1957, and that was the question of Margaret Chase Smith's vote on the jury-trial amendment in the 1957 Civil Rights Act being tied to a Passamaquoddy public works project up there in--
- M: Maine.
- G: --New England. Yes, Maine. Do you recall if there was a connection between her vote and this?
- M: I have a very vague recollection that somebody alleged that there was, but I don't--
- G: That was the--yes. Do you think there was substance to it?
- M: I just don't know. Johnson had a lot of sway with Mrs. Smith. She thought he was pretty terrific, and he could usually get her vote, or very often get it anyway. I told the story in my book of the vote on the nomination of Admiral Lewis Strauss to be secretary of

commerce, which was a great battle of the day. At the very end, when the vote came, there was dead silence in the chamber and the clerk was calling [the roll]. No one knew how it was going to come out except Johnson; he knew every vote. And the clerk said, "Mrs. Smith." "No." And there was "Ahhh"--you could hear the breath exhale. And Barry Goldwater said, "Goddamn!" And you could hear it all over the chamber. LBJ just looked [at his notes], never looked at her, just kept writing his numbers down.

G: Bet it didn't go in the [*Congressional Record*] that way, did it?

M: It didn't appear that way, no. No. Well, this is fascinating--

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview VIII